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Abstract
More users and companies make use of cloud services every day. They all expect a perfect performance and any issue
to remain transparent to them. This last statement is very challenging to perform. A user’s activities in our cloud can
affect the overall performance of our servers, having an impact on other resources.
We can consider these kind of activities as fraudulent. They can be either illegal activities, such as launching a DDoS
attack or just activities which are undesired by the cloud provider, such as Bitcoin mining, which uses substantial
power, reduces the life of the hardware and can possibly slow down other user’s activities.
This article discusses a method to detect such activities by using non-intrusive, privacy-friendly data: billing data.
We use OpenStack as an example with data provided by Telemetry, the component in charge of measuring resource
usage for billing purposes. Results will be shown proving the efficiency of this method and ways to improve it will be
provided as well as its advantages and disadvantages.
Keywords: OpenStack, Ceilometer, Cloud Computing, Machine Learning, Classification, Security, Networks,
Intrusion, Random Forest, Bitcoin Mining
1. Introduction
Cloud computing used to be tech leaders’ dream: a
paradigm where computing becomes a service. It allows
companies and users to use as much compute power or
storage as needed, paying only for what is used. In
this way, using one hundred computers during one hour
costs the same as using one single computer for one
hundred hours [1].
Users of cloud computing have many different needs.
Some use a website, for example a social network, some
perform mathematical calculations and some use a vir-
tual machine to deploy a production web application,
among many other uses. They all require different lev-
els of abstractions. A user of a webmail client does not
need to know what operating system the server is using
while someone who wants to create a website might not
know how to manage a webserver.
The most common paradigms these days are SaaS, Soft-
ware as a Service; PaaS, Platform as a Service; and IaaS,
Infrastructure as a Service [4]. If we look at them from
the point of view of security, in the first two cases, the
user has limited capabilities to conduct fraudulent ac-
tivities due to the lack of power he has. There are al-
ways security risks — no one can deny this —, but the
paradigm that is most useful for fraudulent activity is
the last one: IaaS, which normally offers complete ad-
ministrator permissions to the user making it essential
to have an intrusion detection system in place, to avoid
other users being affected by the behavior of the fraud-
ulent user [19].
Usually, users in a cloud are completely isolated, mean-
ing that it is not common for one user to get access to
data owned by someone else or directly interfere with
other workloads. However, most clouds are configured
to be flexible, allowing a user to use more than the as-
signed resources at some points, to account for pikes
in use, or just because they are not being used. In ad-
dition, Ethernet links are shared amongst all the work-
loads, which make them an easy target. The more band-
width someone uses, the slower the other workloads will
run.
In addition, there are activities, which might appear as
non-fraudulent to the user but are undesired for cloud
providers. I am talking about Bitcoin mining [2], or
Litecoin mining [7], which is becoming increasingly
popular and harder to do. Mining cryptocurrencies uses
much higher power consumption and, furthermore, it
reduces the lifespan of our software [20]. In addition,
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there is the legal aspect of creating digital money using
someone else’s infrastructure. As a consequence, cryp-
tocurrency mining is something most cloud providers
would like to avoid.
Most intrusion detection systems (IDS) nowadays re-
quire network packet inspections [15], invading a user’s
privacy. In the age of Internet surveillance, it is under-
standable that users do not feel comfortable having all
their data inspected by a third party application. Is there
a way to detect fraudulent activity while respecting a
user’s privacy? A way of doing this would be to use
data aggregates, which do not give a lot of detail, such
as CPU usage or the number of outgoing packets in a
closed interval, to perform a first classification. Data
aggregates as a privacy-friendly method to collect data
has previously been used by many others such as [21].
In case a fraudulent activity is suspected, then a more
in-depth method can be used. This way allows users
who run regular workloads to keep their privacy while
detecting suspicious activity.
1.1. Objectives
This article details a method to collect samples of
data from an OpenStack cluster [12], featuring regular
workloads and fraudulent ones. With this data we are
to try different classification algorithms such as SVM or
random forests in order to find the one offering the best
results.
We will try to classify 5 types of jobs: a regular work-
load, hadoop, which can use resources in many differ-
ent ways; a very CPU-intensive job, simulating mathe-
matical calculations; an internal DDoS attack, from one
virtual machine to another inside our cloud; a physical
network failure, to see if I can distinguish it from a regu-
lar job; and cryptocurrency mining, I’ll get data of both
Bitcoin and Litecoin mining.
Once initial results are shown and an algorithm chosen,
we will proceed to discuss ways to improve the results
by making use of a meta-classifier, creating a proof-of-
concept that, using the existing data, simulates how it
would work in a real cloud, in real time.
In conclusion, we define a method to detect fraudulent
or suspicious activity in a cloud environment using met-
rics, which are normally collected for billing purposes,
which do not offer too much insight on the user’s activi-
ties but it can detect an activity as suspicious and trigger
an alarm for further investigation.
2. OpenStack
OpenStack, born as a joint project of Nasa and
Rackspace in 2010, is an open-source Cloud Comput-
ing platform for public and private clouds. Its main goal
is to enable companies of any size to have their own
private cloud at a low cost, feature rich and with a vi-
brant community developing it all over the world [12].
Before the release of open source cloud operating sys-
tems, companies had two options: they either bought
clusters or rely on external companies who provided a
cloud, such as Amazon. With OpenStack, or other alter-
natives, such as CloudStack [8], companies can use their
existing infrastructure for an in-premise, private cloud,
which grants them a much higher security.
OpenStack offers a set of separate components, which
make it very easy to scale, offering different services
such as compute, bock or object storage, network,
databases or orchestration as a service (look at the figure
below). The following sections take a look to the most
important of these components.
Figure 1: OpenStack architecture. Source: OpenStack Foundation.
2.1. Main Components
2.1.1. Compute (Nova)
Nova is the subproject that takes care of providing
compute power as a service. It can be plugged to one
or several hypervisors such as Qemu [9] or KVM [10].
It consists of a controller node, which uses an API to
take requests, and several compute nodes, which are the
ones where the virtual machines will reside and whose
resources they will use [13].
Compute nodes can be added at any point very easily,
as well as removed, making Nova highly available, with
a single failure point, which is the controller, and very
easy to scale. The controller node is the only one who
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has knowledge of all the computes and, based on the re-
sources they have, their availability and another increas-
ing number of constraints, it decides where to deploy
each new virtual machine.
2.1.2. Glance (Image)
Glance provides the user with a RESTful API to
store, discover and serve virtual machine images. It can
also store volumes, which can be used as a template for
new ones [13].
These images can be stored in a wide variety of file sys-
tems, either in block storage or object storage file sys-
tems such as the one managed OpenStack Swift.
2.1.3. Cinder (Block Storage)
Cinder takes care of providing block storage as a ser-
vice. In reality, it started as a fork of Nova, which was
modified to manage virtual volumes instead of virtual
machines. These volumes can, again, feature any file
system suitable to the user, such as Ceph [13].
2.1.4. Keystone (Identity)
The Keystone subproject manages authentication, to-
kens and policies for the entire OpenStack ecosystem
by providing a RESTful API used by projects to control
access permissions as well as to discover and provide
access to other services in OpenStack, which are regis-
tered in Keystone [13].
2.1.5. Neutron (Network)
Neutron, previously known as Quantum, provides
network as a service to any resource created and man-
aged by other components. For example, it can create
different vlans to isolate several virtual machines from
each other, as well as creating virtual network compo-
nents such as routers. Furthermore, with recent updates,
it also provides Firewall as a Service and Load Balancer
as a Service [13].
2.1.6. Swift (Object Storage)
Swift is the project in charge of highly available, dis-
tributed object storage. Recently, a lot of companies
are using Swift together with Ceph, an open source
distributed file system by Inktank, in order to provide
higher availability [13].
2.1.7. Ceilometer (Telemetry)
The most relevant component for this article is
Ceilometer, now known as OpenStack Telemetry. It
was first meant to be a metering component for Open-
Stack. However, many other applications have been
suggested, some of them are very interesting. The rea-
son why so many different applications have arisen is
because Ceilometer’s job is to report usage metrics, data
from each resource in OpenStack at regular intervals
[13]. The following section will describe Ceilometer
with some more detail.
3. Infrastructure and operating system
The OpenStack cluster used to collect the data for this
article was a set of 3 Intel NUCs D54250WYKH1 [11]
provided by Cisco Systems. The NUCs have 2 network
cards each, an Ethernet one, connecting them through a
switch, and a wireless one, giving them Internet access.
In terms of storage, they have 2 solid state drives each,
a 250GB one for the operating system and OpenStack
installation and a 1TB one to be used by Cinder for ob-
ject storage. In addition, each has 16GB of ram.
The operating system used is Ubuntu 14.04 amd 64 +
OpenStack IceHouse. The Ethernet nic has been used as
the flat interface and the wireless one as the public inter-
face. Neutron, the networking component of OpenStack
has not been used in favor of nova’s legacy networking,
which was simpler to install and, because of the types
of data collected, did not alter the result.
One of the NUCs was used as both a controller and
a compute node, and the other two acted as compute
nodes.
4. Data collection
4.1. Justification of the data collected
As previously mentioned, we plan to use data aggre-
gates of several common metrics, instead of perform-
ing packet inspections or looking for flow patterns like
many intrusion detection systems in the market cur-
rently do, such as Snort [15].
The reason for this is to offer a higher privacy to the user.
In a society where concern for privacy is increasing ex-
ponentially, we need more solutions that offer security
without sacrificing a user’s privacy. A way to respect it
is to make the data anonymous by hiding detailed pat-
terns. We collect slices of usage, which show us rates
of change of different metrics over the last few seconds.
Similar rates of change probably mean similar activity.
In our case we use five seconds aggregates of 3 of the
most common metrics available in all systems: CPU,
disk and network.
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4.2. Types of data
One of the initial goals was to use a small number of
metrics. Before using each metric I have transformed
it to show the rate of change of the metric during the
current interval [? ]. The metrics are:
• CPU util: in tan percent.
• Disk.read.requests.rate: in requests/second.
• Disk.read.bytes.rate: in bytes/second.
• Disk.write.requests.rate: in requests/second
• Disk.write.bytes.rate: in bytes/second.
• Network.incoming.bytes.rate: in bytes/second.
• Network.incoming.packets.rate: in pack-
ets/second.
• Network.outgoing.bytes.rate: in bytes/second.
• Network.outgoing.packets.rate: in packets/second
All this data is collected per each virtual resource in
our cluster virtual machines, volumes, virtual routers,
etc. , every 5 seconds. In this way, we can easily
remove data from resources we do not need such as
other users’ virtual machines. It is worth pointing out
the reason why both network incoming/outgoing bytes
and packets are collected. The reason for this is to
enable the classifier to distinguish between applications
that send few, big packets, instead of many, small ones,
allowing it to create a ratio with the number of packets
and size.
This pipeline is configured in the Ceilometer
pipeline.yml file located under /etc/ceilometer in
each compute node. Once it has been modified, you
need to restart the ceilometer-agent-compute process in
all the servers. The file should instantly appear in the
specified path and data samples will be appended to it
every 5 seconds.
The next step is to run an experiment, such as the ones
described below, to generate data.
4.3. Experiments
In order to proof that this method can not only detect
fraudulent activities but also classify them, to a certain
extent, I decided to run several experiments including
several types of fraudulent activities, infrastructure fail-
ures and regular workloads.
4.4. General workloads
Most the common workloads that run in our clouds
have very different fingerprints [18]. Some will require
little activity, while some others will use a lot of re-
sources.
In order to run experiments that represent as many com-
mon workloads as possible, I decided to use Hadoop
and run a benchmark suite by Intel, called HiBench
[6], which runs several hadoop jobs in a sequence, con-
taining benchmarks stressing certain resources, such as
CPU or disk, but also regular algorithms such as PageR-
ank.
In addition, in order to make sure I can distinguish be-
tween cryptocurrencies and very CPU-intensive work-
loads, I also ran extra experiments using the Linux
Stress tool [16].
4.5. Fraudulent activities
4.5.1. Internal DDoS attack
The first fraudulent activity I created data of is an in-
ternal DDoS attack. By internal, I mean that it orig-
inates from virtual machines within our cloud and it
is aimed to another virtual machine within our cloud.
OpenStack offers resource over allocation by default,
when possible, so a hacker could perform such an attack
in order to attempt to slow down resources belonging to
other users, impacting in their business operations and
resulting in a potential decrease in income.
The attack was a Ping flood attack [5]. I set it up by
creating a custom Ubuntu image that, upon boot, would
monitor a remote file in a different cluster waiting for
a victim’s ip. Once an ip was set in this remote file, it
would create one hundred threads that would ping the
victim, with the maximum allowed ICMP packet size,
65,535 bytes.
The experiment consisted of 50 virtual machines that
attacked another machine in the same cluster using its
IP. While running it, I could clearly notice a decreased
overall speed in the cluster and, in some cases, I re-
ceived timeout errors when trying to access virtual web-
servers hosted in one of the nodes affected by the attack.
4.5.2. Cryptocurrency mining
Cryptocurrencies have become increasingly popular
in recent years, starting with the release of Bitcoins
reaching a price of $1242 per coin in November 29th
2013 (see figure below). With this growth comes a
growth in the difficulty of mining these currencies [17].
It is not unexpected, as a consequence, that users try to
use cloud environments to mine them, using a lot of re-
sources, and decreasing the life of the hardware in the
data center.
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Figure 2: Bitcoin and Litecoin Value in USD.
I decided to run experiments both mining Bitcoins
and Litecoins. Bitcoins use the SHA-256 algorithm,
while Litecoins use the Scrypt algorithm. Initially, I
tried to distinguish between them, as separate classes.
Unfortunately, no good results where achieved, due to
almost identical fingerprints, so for the purpose of this
article, both Bitcoins and Litecoins have been treated as
a single class.
For the experiments I used minerd, a CPU miner,
needed because of the lack of GPU most servers have.
Mining using the CPU is usually slower, but if several
big virtual machines perform it, acceptable speeds could
be reached.
4.6. Failures
To simulate hardware failure I decided to disconnect
the network of one of the physical nodes while an in-
stance of HiBench was running in a virtual machine.
Several nodes, a master and one or more slaves, which
perform the task while the master coordinates them,
form a hadoop cluster. The network failure caused the
virtual hadoop node to become isolated from the hadoop
cluster, not being able to contact the master, thus termi-
nating the current job as a failure.
While running this experiment almost all activity
stopped in the physical cluster, including in its virtual
machines. It makes sense for this to happen because
OpenStack relies on network connectivity to synchro-
nize and manage its services as well as to provide Inter-
net to the virtual resources.
5. Results
5.1. Expected Patterns
Each one of the experiments should have different
characteristics, which make it classifiable. Before trying
different classifiers, this section discusses what might
make each case unique and if it would be possible to
classify them manually, showing the data obtained after
the experiments.
5.2. General workloads
As previously discussed, two types of general work-
loads have been run: a Hadoop benchmark and a highly
CPU-intensive job. It seems a fair assumption that the
hadoop experiment will have values scattered along the
entire spectrum, in all the metrics. As I said, HiBench is
a collection of jobs that benchmark different aspects of
a hadoop cluster, so we would expect, for example, both
low and high network usage, as well as CPU and disk. If
we look at a scatter plot representing how network and
CPU relate to each other as shown in the figure below,
we can see that there is no clear pattern.
Figure 3: Hadoop scatter plot.
On the other hand, we have the CPU-intensive job.
This job simulates mathematical calculation, which
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could be taking place in the cloud as means to improve
performance and speed. This kind of job would prob-
ably have very low, if any, network traffic as well as a
relatively low disk usage, in most cases. However, CPU
should be peaking most of the time. Looking at the scat-
ter plot below we can see that the samples cluster on the
highest point in CPU usage while staying very low in
both network and disk.
Figure 4: CPU intensive scatter plot.
5.3. Fraudulent activity
5.3.1. Internal DDoS
The ping flood attack works by sending a big number
of ICMP packets to a victim, using most of its resources,
as a consequence. We would expect the data collected
to have high values for network and some CPU load,
while having relatively low values for disk.
As it can be seen in the figure below, a very high number
of bytes are being sent while we have a low, but constant
CPU usage. Note that we lost some of the data, which
appears as several dots in the lowest left part of the plot,
possibly due to timeouts caused by the attack.
Figure 5: DDoS scatter plot.
5.3.2. Cryptocurrency mining
The process of mining a digital currency usually con-
sists of calculating hashes, what is called proof-of-work,
using costly algorithms, which take time and CPU re-
sources. This method is also used for password encryp-
tions in order to render a brute force attack unfeasible.
In this experiment I have data of both Bitcoin, using the
SHA-256 algorithm, and Litecoin, using the more com-
mon Scrypt algorithm.
In addition, in order to make the experiment more real, I
joined mining pools, so I would also expect a noticeable
amount of network traffic present during the mining op-
eration, probably a regular amount of traffic.
Looking at the scatter plot below, containing mixed data
of Bitcoin and Litecoin generation; we can see that the
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expected results were correct. The vertical strips visible
in the plot show us that there was a repetition of network
traffic patterns, which would be correct for cryptocur-
rency mining.
Figure 6: Cryptocurrency mining scatter plot.
5.4. Failure
Finally, for the network down experiment, we would
expect to see minimal values of all the metrics, proba-
bly making it almost invisible in the plots where several
experiments appear together.
Indeed, the following scatter plot shows that less than 3
Figure 7: Network failure scatter plot.
5.5. Plots
Having discussed the data we get from each experi-
ment, we also need to discuss whether they are visually
distinguishable when represented together. The easier
they can be distinguished visually, the easier it will be
to classify them. Orange [14] offers an option to evalu-
ate different representations and return the plot showing
us the most relevant information. After running this al-
gorithm, the best ranking representation is the one with
CPU utilization and network outgoing packet rate, so
let’s look at a scatter plot containing all the data col-
lected.
Figure 8: Mixed data scatter plot.
As it can be seen in the plot above, the data seems to
be fairly easy to classify visually. There clearly is some
overlapping with the cryptocurrency and CPU-intensive
samples and the network failure data does not appear
to be visible, overlapping with the hadoop samples. As
previously expected, the hadoop data is scattered over
the mining and the CPU intensive data. However, we
will see if this affects the results of the classification
algorithms. Finally, the DDoS samples are completely
separated from the rest, which should make it very easy
to detect.
5.6. Algorithm selection
There are many different classifiers, which are used
for many different applications. It is common to try sev-
eral of them to see which one offers a better result with
the kind of data for each problem.
In order to rapidly try different algorithms, I used Or-
ange to build a topology, which took the initial data and
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evaluated several learners, generating reports in order to
choose the best one. The topology used was the follow-
ing:
Figure 9: Orange topology.
As it can be seen in the previous topology, the ini-
tial data is loaded and basic transformations are applied
to tell Orange which field is the class and which are
features. Next, all the classification algorithms are ap-
plied to the data. In order to validate the results, cross-
validation is performed.
Cross-validation is common technique in machine
learning to ensure that the results are not coincidence
and to ensure they can be replicated. In order to do
this, the data we have is divided into folds, being 10
the most used number. Once we have 10 equally sized
folds, we use 9 to train the classification model, and the
remaining one to evaluate its efficiency. Once the pro-
cess has finalized, we rotate the folds and repeat it again
10 times, so each fold is used once for evaluation and 9
times for training. As a consequence at the end of the
cross-validation process, we can be sure that the results
are not coincidence and that they are replicable using
different data.
Once all the classifiers have finished, the results are sent
to the learner tester, which creates statistics and com-
parisons on performance and accuracy for each classi-
fier. These results can then be plotted or converted to a
confusion matrix.
The data used contains 36004 instances and, after evalu-
ating it, we will see that the best algorithm was random
forest.
5.7. Analysis
The following plot represents the average proportion
of truths the percentage of correct classifications of
the algorithms shown in the topology in the previous
section.
Figure 10: Classifier performance comparison.
The best one is clearly the random forest classifier
with a 97.5% of samples correctly classified.
A random forest is an ensemble of decision trees,
which work together. The features of the input data
are divided among different trees, depending on how
relevant it is for the final choice. The accuracy of the
classification can change depending on the number of
trees of the forest.
Now that the best algorithm had been found, I created
a python program that takes the same data as input
and applies the random forest classifier from the scikit
library. I wrote this, not only to confirm the results pro-
vided by Orange but also, to be able to automate trials
with more configurations. With it I was able to quickly
get performance results for a varying number of trees
and with different amounts of folds for cross-validation.
These confirmed that the results were correct.
Next, I will discuss how the chosen tree looks like and
what features seem to be more relevant for a correct
classification. This will provide us with a unique insight
on the patterns required for identifying these workloads
as well as a good understanding of what is happening
while a data sample is classified.
The chosen tree for the classification is depicted at
the figure at the end of the article. The image shows
only the first four levels of the tree but it is already
enough to see what the most relevant metric is in this
case: network.incoming.bytes.rate, which is the root of
the tree. According to the condition of whether this
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value is higher or lower than 50.800 bytes/second, we
can already separate most of the samples representing a
ddoss or a hadoop job, which represent a higher usage
of the network, from the rest.
If we look at the left branch, the tree then checks the
CPU utilization. In our samples, a hadoop workload
shows a lower CPU than a DDoS attack, being able to
separate most cases of hadoop samples and more than
half of the DDoS ones. Following again the left branch,
if the CPU is higher than a threshold, then it might be
a cryptocurrency mining or CPU intensive sample. On
the other hand, if the CPU is lower than the threshold,
we can almost be certain that we are classifying a DDoS
sample.
Going one step back and looking at the right branch,
the tree checks the network.incoming.packets.rate. A
DDoS attack will always have a high value for this me-
ter, while a hadoop workload will have a lower one.
This condition allows us to classify these two packets
with very high accuracy.
Going back to the root node and looking at the right
branch, we can see that the classification is not as
straight forward, and 4 levels are not enough to see what
is going on in the tree.
These are some important sub-trees that help make de-
cisions to separate classes:
Figure 11: Subtree 1.
Here we can see some of the most interesting nodes,
where cryptocurrency mining is separated from a CPU-
intensive activity according to the CPU utilization. It is
interesting because classifying between two very CPU
intensive workloads using this condition will probably
be the cause of some of the incorrect results. This con-
dition is repeated in different places along the tree. In
addition, if different workloads are added in the future,
the borderline between CPU-intensive allowed activities
and cryptocurrency mining will become more blurry in
terms of CPU utilization. This justifies the use of a
meta-classifier to perform decisions based on several of
the last collected samples.
Figure 12: Subtree 2.
The next example shows how we can distinguish the
CPU-intensive workload from the cryptocurrency min-
ing one by looking at the network usage. Indeed, if we
do mathematical calculations, the network usage will be
much lower than Bitcoin mining, where there is a con-
stant network flow with the mining pool. In this case, if
we have more than 70.000 outgoing bytes/second, it de-
cides we are mining a cryptocurrency. Otherwise, it de-
cides we are performing an allowed CPU-intensive ac-
tivity. Unlike the previous example, this condition is not
bound to introduce many errors in the classification, as
both jobs have a distinctive network usage fingerprint.
Figure 13: Subtree 3.
Finally, I’ll show an example were the tree classifies
between a DDoS and a Hadoop job, represented in the
image below, in orange and yellow.
When this point in the tree is reached, it means we have
very high network utilization and a relatively low CPU
utilization. What the tree does in this case is to look at
the disk data, which is the metric that makes a difference
in this case.
As it can be seen, if we have more than a certain number
of disk write requests per second (4.333), then we are
trying to classify a Hadoop sample. On the other hand,
if we have high network usage, relatively low CPU and
a low number of disk write requests, we are most likely
dealing with a DDoS sample.
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Figure 14: Decision tree.
5.8. Meta-classifier
We now have a classifier that works approximately
97.5% of the times, however, as the number of work-
loads increase, this number is bound to decrease. In real
life, we cannot expect to detect a Bitcoin mining op-
eration 5 seconds after it starts. Furthermore, it makes
sense that such an activity keeps running for a long time,
so we want to be able to detect an ongoing fraudulent ac-
tivity. If we assume that a fair detection interval is one
hour, then we can use the individual classifications to
perform an hourly statistic and, depending on the over-
all results, we can decide on a positive or a negative
decision.
The meta-classifier will look at the results obtained dur-
ing the last hour. If the percentage of false positives is
under a specified threshold, then a positive decision will
be made.
The previously mentioned python program contains a
proof of concept of such a meta-classifier. Given all
the classification results calculated in the last hour, plus
their correct class, it tries different thresholds to deter-
mine which is the minimum error threshold we need
with the current model to achieve a 100% classification
success. Surprisingly, with such big classification accu-
racy, the threshold can be quite low, in fact, as low as
4% of error would ensure us 100% accuracy with the
current data.
In real environments this threshold could be higher or
lower depending on how cautious we want to be. If we
want to investigate all possible cases, we would set a
high error threshold, to make sure that even if we have
a 30% - 40% of positives in an hour, an alarm gets trig-
gered.
On the other hand, if we only want to be noticed when
there is a case with a very high probability, we would
set the threshold lower, to 5% - 10%, for example.
The algorithm I used to test the results with different
thresholds simulates an hour by taking only the samples
that would have been generated in this period of time
and assumes that there will be only one virtual machine
for each case, to keep it simple. Given this constraint
and the correct classification values, it checks if the re-
sults from the random forest have an error lower than the
threshold, which has been passed as a parameter. This
method prints the cases that have not been properly clas-
sified or, in case all of them are successfully classified,
it prints a success message at the end.
6. Conclusion
This article has shown a method to detect fraudulent
activities running in our OpenStack cluster by means of
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a random forest. The data used to detect such activities
is formatted of a slice of the last 5 seconds of resource
usage for each virtual resource; let it be virtual machines
or volumes, among others. As with any method, it offers
certain advantages but it also has some shortcomings,
which will be discussed in this section.
6.1. Advantages
Using data aggregates to classify the activity provides
a layer of privacy other methods don’t. Of course, de-
tecting a user’s activities is not privacy-friendly itself,
but with this framework, you do not have detailed infor-
mation about what they are doing, but are able to detect
certain high level patterns, which identify suspicious ac-
tivity. For example, if a company is using our cloud for
confidential activities, we would only be able to know
that they are running mathematical calculations, or that
they are using distributed systems, which is done by
many companies these days. We would not be able,
however, to tell what they are calculating or what in-
formation is being sent among nodes in distributed sys-
tems.
Another advantage is the simplicity of collecting this
kind of data. Imagine we are a web hosting com-
pany and we run on top of OpenStack. Then we will
boot virtual machines to be used as web server by our
customers. Let’s also assume that the cloud provider
does not offer an intrusion detection system. Using the
method proposed here, even without being administra-
tors of the cloud, not having direct access to the physical
resources data, we can still obtain the required data from
our virtual machines and send it to our own systems for
offline, or even real time, analysis.
6.2. Shortcomings
As with any method, there are shortcomings to using
it and it has some limitations.
The most important shortcoming is the amount of lost
information in the data aggregates. While it does not
affect much with the tested activities, as the number of
different classes to classify increases, so will the num-
ber of similar workloads, decreasing the effectiveness of
the classification. This is why this method can be used
of a first step of a fraudulent activity detection pipeline.
It can be used to detect suspicious activity and then trig-
ger an alarm that starts a more in-depth IDS that will
determine if it was truly a fraudulent workload or not.
By doing this, we reduce the amount of data an IDS has
to process, while being able to reuse the data that is col-
lected in order to bill the customer.
6.3. Future work
Thanks to the use of OpenStack, this article has been
accepted as a conference talk in the next OpenStack
Summit, which takes places in Paris, this November.
The talk, which will be a more OpenStack-focused, is
called Using Ceilometer data to detect fraudulent ac-
tivity in our OpenStack cluster [22] and several people
have already emailed the author expressing their inter-
est in watching it.
In terms of development, the next step is to create a real
time pipeline that runs in a production ready OpenStack
cluster, classifying the activity, using a meta-classifier,
and sending hourly reports. In order to do this, an easy
way would be to modify Ceilometer so it performs the
classification for each sample and saves the result in the
database as a new metric. Then, once an hour, the meta-
classifier can retrieve the last samples and perform the
final decision.
This method, modifying Ceilometer, makes it easy to
create a real time pipeline for OpenStack. However,
this would not be compatible with other clouds, such
as AWS or Microsoft Azure. It would probably be bet-
ter to create everything as a separate program that ac-
cepts data input via a restful API. This would allow the
classification itself to take place anywhere, even in the
cloud itself. In addition, it would allow cloud users, not
administrators, to monitor their own resources, having
complete control of this data.
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